This paper uses Japanese data to investigate the relationship between monetary policy and the yield curve. We find that the response of the yield curve depends in an important way on the maintained hypothesis about how monetary policy affects the economy. Under the liquidity effect maintained hypothesis monetary policy only has transient effects on the yield curve. Under the costly price adjustment maintained hypothesis, however, monetary policy has large and persistent effects on yields of all maturities.
interest rate policy. Eggertson and Woodford (2003) argue that a monetary authority can still influence economic activity when nominal interest rates are zero by taking actions that affect market expectations about the future time path of variables such as interest rates, inflation or exchange rates. One way to assess the ability of a central bank to affect expectations is to look retrospectively and ascertain the extent to which previous monetary policy surprises have affected bond yields of different maturities. If monetary policy is indeed a potent tool for altering expectations then this should show up in the responses and variance decompositions of medium and long-term bonds yields to suitably identified shocks to monetary policy.
In order to isolate the effects of monetary policy on the yield curve we must first identify monetary policy shocks. Our strategy for identifying monetary policy combines zero restrictions as in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996) , Bernanke and Mihov (1996) , Leeper, Sims, and Zha (1996) , Miyao (2002) , and Shioji (1997) with sign restrictions on the impulse response functions as in Faust (1999) and Uhlig (1999) . An advantage of our empirical strategy is that it is straightforward to investigate the robustness of any conclusions to the maintained assumptions about how monetary policy affects the macro-economy.
We consider two distinct maintained hypotheses. The liquidity effect hypothesis maintains that a surprise tightening in monetary policy increases short-term nominal interest rates, and lowers output, prices, and monetary aggregates. This hypothesis reflects the consensus view about how monetary policy affects the U.S. economy [see e.g. the recent survey article by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 1999] .
We also consider the costly price adjustment hypothesis. This hypothesis maintains that a surprise tightening in monetary policy lowers interest rates, money supply, output, and prices. It is consistent with the implications of costly price adjustment models with monopolistic competition as in: Rotemberg (1996) , Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1997) , Ireland (1997) , and Aiyagari and Braun (1998) . Braun and Shioji (2002) find that Japanese data are more consistent with the costly price adjustment hypothesis. Here we report results under each of the two maintained hypotheses in order to compare their implications for the Japanese yield curve.
The choice of maintained hypothesis has important implications for the interaction of monetary policy and the yield curve. Under the liquidity effect hypothesis innovations in monetary policy have highly transient effects on short-term interest rates and the slope and curvature of the yield curve. Moreover, monetary policy shocks only account for a small fraction of the long-run variance in yields. Under the costly price adjustment hypothesis, in contrast, there is a rich set of interactions between monetary policy and the yield curve. Monetary policy shifts the level of the yield curve and produces large hump-shaped responses in yields of all maturities. Monetary policy also accounts for a substantial fraction of the long-term variance in long-term yields.
Our analysis is related to recent work by Ang and Piazzesi (2003) and Evans and Marshall (2001) . Ang and Piazzesi (2003) consider the role of alternative macroeconomic shocks in explaining movements in U.S. Treasury yields using an affine model of the term structure and find that economic activity accounts for only a small fraction of the variance in long-term bonds. Evans and Marshall (2001) , in contrast, use a common factor model of the term structure and identify a variety of macroeconomic shocks. They find that demand shocks account for a significant fraction of the variance in long-term bonds. Our work complements these papers in several ways. We describe how the implications of monetary policy for the yield curve vary across alternative maintained hypotheses about the economic effects of monetary policy shocks. We also consider the role of financial shocks in explaining movements in macroeconomic variables. Finally we investigate these issues for Japan, which has a different institutional and economic environment from the United States.
THE MODEL

Reduced form Vector Auto-Regression
The reduced form econometric model consists of a vector auto-regression or VAR
where, J denotes the number of lags, x t is an (mx1) vector of variables and u t is an (mx1) vector of disturbances. Denote the covariance matrix of u t as Σ. The baseline VAR specification includes six lags of monthly data on four macroeconomic variables: the Consumer Price Index less food (CPI), Industrial Production (Y), the monetary base adjusted for reserve requirements (M), and the one-month TIBOR rate (R). The sample period is October 1987 through May 1999. All variables are expressed in log-levels with the exception of R, which is expressed in levels.
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The price level and industrial production are included because they summarize the two principal objectives of monetary policy: promoting price stability and stabilizing fluctuations in output. The Monetary base and the one-month TIBOR rate are both included to help discriminate between the implications of the liquidity effect hypothesis and the costly price adjustment hypothesis. Under the liquidity effect hypothesis narrow money and the short rate move in opposite directions in response to an innovation in monetary policy. The costly price adjustment hypothesis, in contrast, implies that these two variables move in the same direction in response to an innovation in monetary policy. This identification issue is discussed in more detail in Section 1. A number of other variables have also been considered in the literature. Most prominently commodity prices have been shown to render U.S. data more consistent with the liquidity effect hypothesis [see e.g. Sims, 1992 and Evans, 1996] . Given the important role that exports play in the Japanese economy, the exchange rate may also be either an important information variable for the Bank of Japan or possibly a target of monetary policy. Finally, Japan imports most of its oil and economic activity may be sensitive to fluctuations in the price of oil. To explore these possibilities we also report results below in which the baseline list of macroeconomic variables is augmented to include alternatively the commodity price index (PCOM), the yen/$ exchange rate (YENDOL) or an oil price index (POIL).
To complete the list of variables two common factors (F1, F2) are included that in conjunction with R summarize the dynamics of the yield curve. Previous work has found that the yield curve is well-summarized by three factors that, respectively, shift its level, slope, and curvature [see e.g. Litterman and Scheinkman, 1988 , Singleton, 1994 , and Hiraki, Shiraishi, and Takezawa, 1996 . We also assume a three-factor model of the Japanese yield curve. However, in contrast to the previous literature, the first factor is taken to be the one-month TIBOR rate. The remaining two common factors, F1 and F2 are estimated by principal components. This insures that they are by construction orthogonal to the one-month rate and to each other. 
Identification of Monetary Policy
We assume that the disturbances are driven by m structural shocks that are mutually orthogonal:
where P is a (m × m) matrix, and the covariance matrix of ε t is a (6 × 6) identity matrix. Suppose further that the monetary policy shock is the fourth element in the vector ε t . Under these assumptions, identifying monetary policy amounts to determining the values of the elements in the fourth column of the matrix P Ϫ1 . Our strategy for identifying monetary policy-that is the elements of this fourth column-is Bayesian. Following Uhlig (2001) we assume a diffuse normal/Wishart prior over ([C 0 ,C 1 ,...,C J ],͚) that is multiplied by an indicator function. This indicator function allows us to indirectly impose prior restrictions that are difficult to impose directly on the parameters of the model. The value of this indicator function is determined by the intersection of two events. First, throughout the whole analysis attention is limited to a block recursive identification structure. Second, the value of the indicator function is determined according to whether or not a set of sign restrictions on the impulse response to innovations in monetary policy is satisfied. These sign restrictions embody a particular prior about how monetary policy affects the economy. We consider each of these events in turn.
Recursive restrictions. We start by partitioning the model variables into three groups. For the baseline economy prices and output are assigned to the first partition, monetary base and the nominal interest rate are assigned to the second partition, and the two yield curve common factors are assigned to the third partition. Assume further that P Ϫ1 is block triangular:
2. More details on the construction of the common factors are provided in Section 2.
Under these assumptions shocks to variables in the first partition affect all variables contemporaneously, shocks to variables in partition two affect only variables in the second and third partition, and shocks to variables in the third partition have no contemporaneous impact on variables in either the first or second partitions.
This block recursive structure partitions the time t information set of the monetary authority into two parts: variables that the monetary authority observes prior to setting current period monetary policy and variables that the monetary authority does not observe contemporaneously. In particular, we assume that the monetary authority observes the current shocks to output and prices prior to setting monetary policy but does not observe the period t shocks to either financial sector variable. The former restriction is relatively common in the literature [see e.g. Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1992 , Bernanke and Blinder, 1992 , and Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994 and is also consistent with the implications of dynamic general equilibrium models of money such as that of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001) .
The latter restriction is imposed to mitigate the risk of an identification problem raised by Leeper, Sims, and Zha (1996) . They give an example of a monetary policy feedback rule that reacts to multiple current period interest rates and show that this rule can induce indeterminacy of equilibrium and can also render identification infeasible.
Our assumptions also imply that demand for the monetary base does not respond contemporaneously to shocks in the two common factors. We think of demand for base money as coming from three main sources: exchange credit that facilitates trade among firms as in Kahn and Roberds (2002) , transactions demand by households-carrying cash can be convenient if ATM machines are not nearby or closed, 3 and money needed to settle tax payments with the government. We are assuming that each of these three demands for money is insensitive to current shocks to the yield curve.
Given this block recursive structure, identification of the innovation to monetary policy involves pinning down the coefficients in P Ϫ1 22 and P Ϫ1 32 . Block recursive identification schemes have several convenient properties. One of them is that identification of P Ϫ1 22 does not depend on the values of P Ϫ1 in partitions 1 and 3. In particular, P Ϫ1 22 can be derived without referring to any of the elements of the other partitions. A second property is that
where, Θ is a two by two matrix that is uniquely determined from Σ so that once P Ϫ1 22 is identified, P Ϫ1 32 is also identified. These properties can be ascertained directly using the fact that Σ ϭ P Ϫ1 P Ϫ1′ and by imposing the block recursive zero restrictions. It follows that identification of sector 2 shocks can proceed without making any further assumptions about how the shocks in the other two sectors are identified.
Sign restrictions. We turn next to describe how we define events that satisfy the block recursive restrictions and thereby identify P Ϫ1 22 . The general strategy is to 3. In Japan many ATM machines close on weekends and/or evenings.
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use simulation methods to produce a pseudo-random sequence of VAR parameters, deduce a sequence of P Ϫ1 22 s by imposing the block recursion structure and then to use these objects to construct a pseudo-random sequence of impulse response functions. Given this sequence of impulse response functions rejection methods are used to impose the sign restrictions implied by a particular prior about how monetary policy affects the economy.
We start by taking k 1 random draws from a Normal/Wishart family whose parameters are given by the estimated reduced form VAR coefficients, Ĉ ≡ [Ĉ 0 ,Ĉ 1 ,...,Ĉ J ] , and the estimated covariance matrix of disturbances, Σ . Given a draw from the distribution of the VAR parameters, the recursive identification restrictions imply a particular P Ϫ1 22 . Our interest centers on the second column of P Ϫ1 22 because it corresponds to a shock to monetary policy. The elements of P Ϫ1 22 are related to Σ, in the following way:
Denote the eigen-values of Ω as µ 1 and µ 2 , and the corresponding normalized eigenvectors by ν 1 and ν 2 . Then, a, in the second column of P
Ϫ1
22 has the following representation:
where, Uhlig (2001) shows that the αs defined in this way provide a complete characterization of the set of as that satisfy Ω ϭ P
The representation given by Equation (6) also implies that an innovation to monetary policy is only identified up to a one-dimensional continuum that is indexed by α 1 . A particular prior about how monetary policy affects the economy defines a subset of this one-dimensional continuum. To find this subset we draw k 2 random α 1 's from a uniform [Ϫ1,1] distribution, setting α 2 so that the squared α's sum to one. At this point we have a completely identified system and we can compute the impulse response function to monetary policy. Rejecting draws (events) that violate the sign restrictions imposes a particular prior about how monetary policy affects the economy.
We consider two distinct sets of sign restrictions. Each set of sign restrictions corresponds to a competing prior about how monetary policy affects economic activity. The first prior is referred to as the Liquidity Effect Hypothesis. Under this hypothesis we assume that 1. the response of the price level is negative in a majority of the first seven months following the arrival of a contractionary shock to monetary policy; 4. In what follows, the month in which the shock arrives is labeled 0.
2. the response of output is negative in a majority of the first seven months following the arrival of the shock; 3. the response of the monetary base is negative in a majority of the first six months; 4. the response of the one-month rate is positive in a majority of the first six months.
The liquidity effect maintained hypothesis is designed to reflect the consensus view about how monetary policy affects the economy. Friedman (1968) suggests that liquidity effects might last for up to a year. And results reported in the survey article by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) are consistent with these restrictions with the possible exception of the price level.
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The second maintained hypothesis is referred to as the Costly Price Adjustment Hypothesis. The costly price adjustment hypothesis consists of the following sign restrictions:
1. the response of the price level is negative in a majority of the first seven months following the arrival of an innovation to monetary policy; 2. the response of output is negative in a majority of the first seven months following the arrival of a shock to monetary policy; 3. the response of the monetary base is negative in a majority of the first six months following the arrival of a shock to monetary policy; 4. the response of R is negative in a majority of the first six months following the arrival of a shock to monetary policy.
This second hypothesis is consistent with the implications of monopolistically competitive costly price adjustment models such as those of Rotemberg (1996) , Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1997) , Ireland (1997) , and Aiyagari and Braun (1998) . In these models a surprise contraction in monetary policy reduces output in the short-run because prices are now high relative to future periods, gradually lowers prices, the growth rate of monetary aggregates, and nominal interest rates due to an expectation that inflation in future periods will fall. While these responses are consistent with some leading sticky price models of money, not all costly price adjustment models have this property. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001) , for example, developed a model with costly price adjustment in which the responses of the economy to shocks in monetary policy are consistent with the liquidity effect hypothesis. Instead, it is probably best to view this hypothesis as reflecting effects that are plausible in the sense that they are the dominant effect in the dynamic general equilibrium models listed above.
Our algorithm places restrictions on both the choice of P and the parameters of the reduced form VAR. This approach to identification differs from the standard approach in this literature, which seeks to identify P conditional on a particular choice of the model parameters. In Section 2 we compare and contrast the two approaches.
5. They describe the price level response as small, but not necessarily negative in early periods. This aspect of the maintained hypothesis is explored in detail in Braun and Shioji (2002) who find that relaxing the sign restriction on prices produces a large, persistent, and statistically significant price puzzle in Japanese data.
Observe also that the form of the sign restrictions is based entirely on the sign and assigns no weight to the magnitude of the responses. On the one hand, count restrictions better reflect the nature of the consensus about how monetary policy affects the economy. Statements of the consensus perspective focus more on signs than magnitudes [see e.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 1999] . On the other hand, it is possible that sign counts rule out identifications that, for instance, produce big but highly transient liquidity effects. Below we will show that the empirical results are robust to the choice of imposing the hypotheses as sign count restrictions or, alternatively, restrictions on the mean responses over the first 6-7 periods.
ESTIMATION RESULTS
Estimation and Simulation of the Model
Estimation and identification of the model proceeds in three steps. First, the common factors of the term structure are estimated. Second, the VAR is estimated and third, monetary policy is identified using the simulation based rejection method described above.
The underlying data consists of zero-coupon equivalent yields with 11 different maturities. Common factors are constructed from the yield data in the following manner. Each of the 11 yields was regressed on the one-month rate. Then a principal component analysis was performed on the 11 residual series. This analysis indicated that the components corresponding to the two largest eigen-values explain 95.1% of the total variation in the 11 residual series. As a check of the ability of the onemonth rate and the two common factors to summarize movements in yields of alternative maturities, each of the 11 yields was regressed on these three variables. The R square from the regressions was greater than 0.990 in all cases.
The weights the one-month rate and the two common factors receive on each yield are reported in the estimated coefficients do not bear much resemblance to the level, slope, and curvature factors. The magnitude of the first factor (one-month TIBOR rate) falls by nearly half as the maturity of the yield rises from 2 months to 10 years. In addition, the sign changes that one would associate with slope or curvature factors are not present in the coefficients for the first factor. The coefficients for the second factor show a change of sign but the magnitude of the two-month yield and 120-month yield are not very close in absolute value. Given this difficulty in interpreting these factors it is perhaps helpful to explain why we chose to proceed in this manner. The main consideration is parsimony. Since the VAR already includes the one-month rate, treating the one-month rate as a common factor and adding two additional factors summarizes the same information as a conventional three-factor model and reduces the number of estimated coefficients by 92.
When estimating the VAR we treat the two estimated common factors as data as in e.g. Bernanke and Boivin (2003) . Moreover, responses of yields also condition on the weights reported in Table 1 . Our two-step procedure understates the inherent uncertainty in the model. An alternative strategy would be to directly include additional yields in the VAR instead of the two common factors. We chose not to pursue this alternative strategy because of a concern about the numerical stability of the estimates. Yields of different maturities are highly correlated. For our dataset, the contemporaneous correlation coefficients range between 0.95 and 0.99. In such a situation including multiple yields in the same VAR can have a large effect on the condition number of the data matrix that one inverts in the course of OLS estimation of the model. 6 For Japanese data this problem is compounded by the fact that the sample period over which yields are available is relatively short and comovements in the data are strongly influenced by the rise and fall of stock and land prices in the late 1980s and 1990s.
With the common factors in hand, the VAR is estimated and the restrictions of the liquidity effect maintained hypothesis are imposed. Following the discussion in Section 1, the first step is to take a pseudo-random draw from the posterior distribution of the VAR coefficients. Next we take 100 draws from the free elements of P Ϫ1 22 and check to see if they satisfy the sign restrictions for the liquidity hypothesis. For successful draws we tabulate partial sums of the impulse response functions and variance decompositions. This process is repeated for 500 draws from the posterior distribution of the VAR coefficients producing a total of 50,000 trials. Finally, the averages and standard deviations of the impulse responses, and variance decompositions are calculated. This same set of procedures is then repeated for the costly price adjustment maintained hypothesis.
What are the Effects of Monetary Policy on Economic Activity and Yields Under the Two Hypotheses?
Impulse responses: liquidity effect hypothesis. The left panels of Figures 1 and 2 report impulse responses to a tightening in monetary policy under the liquidity effect 6. When the 12-month, 36-month, and 50-month yields are included instead of the common factors, the condition number of the data matrix exceeds 30,000,000,000. maintained hypothesis. Figure 1 contains responses for the VAR variables and also LEVEL, SLOPE, CURVATURE, and the real interest rate. Figure 2 shows responses of 2-month, 12-month, and 60-month yields and term premia. The impulse responses reported in these and all other figures are the average of the impulse responses across valid draws. The other two lines in each figure are, respectively, an upper two standard deviation error band and a lower two standard deviation band across valid draws. The responses for prices, output, and monetary base are expressed in percent (.01 ϭ 1%) and the other variables are expressed as annualized basis points.
The results reported in Figure 1 are based on an overall total of 486 successful draws or about 1% of the 50,000 trials. Only 8.4% of the outerloop draws from the posterior produce one or more valid draw. And on average each successful draw from the posterior distribution produces about 12 valid α 1 's.
Under the liquidity effect maintained hypothesis monetary policy has large but highly transient effects on economic activity. The response of output is large and immediate. One standard deviation (ten basis point) tightening in the one-month rate produces a peak decline in the level of output of 20/100th's of a percent in the second month following the tightening. However, neither the output response nor the one-month rate response is very persistent. Both variables are within 2 standard deviations of zero four months after the shock arrives and damp quickly. The two common factors also respond significantly on impact but then damp quickly thereafter. Prices do not respond much in early periods but gradually fall over time. None of the price responses are more than two standard deviations from zero. The monetary base is the only variable with a persistent response that is precisely estimated. Monetary base drops on impact and is more than two standard deviations from zero in most periods. Figure 1 also reports the responses of LEVEL, SLOPE, CURVATURE, and the real one-month interest rate. The definitions of LEVEL, SLOPE, and CURVATURE follow the example of Ang and Piazzesi (2003) . LEVEL is the average response of the one-month rate, the 12-month yield, and the 60-month yield. SLOPE is the response of the 60-month yield minus the one-month rate and CURVATURE is defined as the response of the one-month rate plus the 60-month rate minus twice the 12-month rate. Finally, the real interest rate is the one-month rate net of the expected inflation rate. A comparison of LEVEL, SLOPE, and CURVATURE with, respectively, the one-month rate, F1, and F2 indicates that the shapes and statistical significance of the responses are very similar. The biggest difference concerns the impact response of LEVEL and the one-month rate. Monetary policy innovations induce a larger impact response in the one-month rate. This difference may explain why the coefficients on the one-month rate in Table 1 are declining in maturity.
The sign of the response of the real interest rate is large but imprecisely estimated. On impact, the response is 18 basis points and rises to a maximum of 23 basis points. In subsequent periods it continues to fluctuate but with no distinct pattern. The error bands are also very large though indicating that the precision of these estimates is very low. Figure 2 reports the response of the yield curve, term premia, and two standard deviation confidence bands to the same innovation for maturities of 6 months, 12 months, and 5 years.
7 Term premia are calculated as departures from the Expectations Hypothesis as in Evans and Marshall (1998) . Here the total number of successful draws rises to 8532 or about 17% of the total draws. Over 66% of the draws from the posterior distribution of the parameters produce at least one valid identification and the average number of valid α 1 's per successful draw from the posterior distribution of parameters exceeds 25.
These impulse responses correspond to a contractionary surprise in monetary policy, that is, a monetary policy shock that lowers output. By comparing the left and right panels of Figure 1 we see that the costly price adjustment maintained hypothesis produces responses that are larger in magnitude and more persistent. The response of output (industrial production) is bowl-shaped and falls by a maximum of 0.04% in the 12th month following a one standard deviation (12 basis point) decline in the one-month rate. Prices and the one-month rate also fall persistently. These responses also exhibit higher precision than under the alternative liquidity effect maintained hypothesis. Price responses are about two standard deviations below zero from month seven and on. And the responses of output are more than two standard deviations below zero in 6 out of the first 12 months following the shock.
Once again the responses and precision of LEVEL, SLOPE, and CURVATURE are quite similar to the responses of, respectively, the one-month rate, F1, and F2. Now 7. These confidence bands are likely to overstated the precision of these estimates due to our twostep estimation procedure. monetary policy shocks have potent dynamic effects on the level of the yield curve. SLOPE first falls and then rises and curvature goes up in early periods.
The response of the real interest rate is also now somewhat smaller but more persistent. It declines by 21 basis points on impact and gradually rises to Ϫ6 basis points by month 24. As before, the real interest rate responses are imprecisely estimated.
Responses of yields and term premia to an innovation in monetary policy are reported in the right panel of Figure 2 . From the perspective of the costly price adjustment hypothesis monetary policy has big and persistent effects on yields of all maturities. All yields have bowl-shaped responses that bottom out at about month seven at 18-20 basis points. The responses are also more precisely estimated as compared to the left panel of Figure 2 . Yields with maturities of 6 and 12 months are both more than two standard deviations below zero for more than a year and the 5-year yield is more than two standard deviations below zero for nine months. The increased persistence in the one-month rate response also produces persistent responses in term premia. Twenty-four months after the shock term premia for all three yields are still between five and six basis points below zero.
Variance decompositions. Table 2 reports the fraction of variance in output, prices, monetary base, interest rates, the two common factors, and the 12-month and 5-year yields accounted for by innovations in monetary policy. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Under the liquidity effect maintained hypothesis monetary policy explains about 29% of the variance in the one-month rate and 58% of the variation in monetary base at step 1. Monetary policy shocks, however, are not important sources of variation in output, prices or the yield curve. Only a maximum of about 5% of the variance in prices, 4% of the variation in output and 6-7% of the variance in yields is attributed to monetary policy at any forecast horizon.
Under the costly price adjustment maintained hypothesis monetary policy continues to be an important source of variation in monetary base and short-term rates. However, monetary policy is also more important for understanding movements in other variables. Now, the fraction of variance in output and prices accounted for by innovations in monetary policy is bigger at longer forecast horizons. At step 60, for instance, monetary policy explains 16% of the variance in prices and 16% of the variance in output. Under the costly price adjustment maintained hypothesis monetary policy is also important for understanding movements in yields of all maturities at all forecast horizons. At step 12, monetary policy accounts for 40% of the variation in the 12-month yield and 35% of the variation in the 5-year yield. And at step 60 monetary policy explains 28% of the variation in both yields.
Is Japanese Data More Consistent with the Liquidity Effect Hypothesis or the Costly Price Adjustment Hypothesis?
A possible concern about our method for identifying monetary policy is that good draws are sufficiently rare that they may be coming from the tail of the posterior distribution of parameter coefficients and in this sense may not be representative of the data. Some of the diagnostics presented above suggest that this is more of an issue for the liquidity effect hypothesis. For instance, only 8% of the draws from the posterior distribution of the VAR parameters produce one or more draws that are consistent with this hypothesis. For the costly price adjustment hypothesis the corresponding figure is 66%.
In order to investigate this issue further we conditioned on the estimated parameters of the VAR as is the convention in the structural VAR literature and took 50,000 draws from α 1 . For the costly price adjustment hypothesis the fraction of successful draws was 28%. Moreover, the impact responses of monetary base and the onemonth rate are precisely estimated.
9 However, for the liquidity effect hypothesis no successful draws were found.
We then increased the number of replications to 100,000 and still found no successful draws. 10 We draw three conclusions from these results. First, the costly price adjustment maintained hypothesis is more consistent with Japanese data than the liquidity effect alternative.
11 Second, if one conditions on the estimated parameters of the VAR when conducting a specification search for monetary policy, it is likely to be quite difficult to find any specification that is consistent with the liquidity effect hypothesis. Third, for those who place strong faith in the liquidity effect hypothesis, allowing for parameter uncertainty in the VAR coefficients provides a way to reconcile this prior with Japanese data. Based on these results and in order to conserve space, the remainder of the paper will just report results for the costly price adjustment maintained hypothesis.
ADDITIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE COSTLY PRICE ADJUSTMENT MAINTAINED HYPOTHESIS
Are Macroeconomic Shocks Important Sources of Variation in the Yield Curve?
Ang and Piazzesi (2003) using U.S. data find that macroeconomic shocks are important for explaining movements in short-term yields but not important for understanding movements in long-term yields. Evans and Marshall (2001) , in contrast, find that macroeconomic shocks explain most of the long-run movements of yields. Variance decomposition results reported in Table 3 allow us to assess the role of macroeconomic shocks in explaining the dynamics of Japanese yields. This table reports the variance decomposition of the 12-month and 60-month yield using the baseline costly price adjustment specification. At short-forecast horizons, monetary policy and the two common factors explain most of the variance in the 9. The average impact response of monetary base is Ϫ0.35% with a standard error of .089% and the one-month rate response is Ϫ13 b.p. with a standard error of 2.1 b.p.
10. We also checked the robustness of this conclusion to the variants of the model reported in Section 3 below. However, if we condition on the estimated VAR coefficients and perform 50,000 replications, no successful draws are found under the liquidity effect hypothesis.
11. See Braun and Shioji (2002) for a detailed investigation of the plausibility of the two hypotheses. yield curve. At step 1, about 56% of the variance in the 12-month yield and 73% of the variance in the 5-year yield is explained by the combination of the two common factors. At longer horizons, though the macroeconomic shocks are more important. At step 60, the combination of output and prices accounts for about 38% of the variance in the 12-month yield and about 25% of the variance in the 5-year yield. Monetary policy explains another 30% of the movements in these two yields. Overall, our results for Japan are more consistent with the findings of Evans and Marshall (2001) . However, monetary policy is more important in Japan for understanding long-run movements in long-term yields. This finding is consistent with some other facts about the Bank of Japan. As compared to the Federal Reserve, the Bank of Japan holds a much larger fraction of long-term bonds on its balance sheets. About 60% of Japanese Monetary Base is backed by long-term government bonds. In addition, the overall size of the Bank of Japan's balance sheets is substantially larger than those of the Federal Reserve.
Are Financial Shocks Important Sources of Variation in
Macroeconomic Activity? Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) find that the slope of the yield curve is a predictor of future economic activity in the 1970s and 1980s in U.S. data. Table 4 reports decompositions of the variance of output and prices under the costly price adjustment maintained hypothesis. Financial shocks do not explain much of the variance in either prices or output at short and medium (1 year) horizons. At long horizons financial sector shocks are somewhat more important. F1 and F2 explain a combined fraction of 17% of the variance in prices and 26% of the variance in output at step 60. 
Are the Results Robust?
Here we explore the robustness of the results in our baseline specification along three dimensions: the choice of variables, the specification of the nominal interest rate and the method of imposing the sign restrictions.
Figures 3 and 4 report the impulse responses for specifications in which we add a seventh variable to the VAR. Our interest here is determining whether our conclusions depend in an important way on the choice of variables. The first panel of each figure reports results for the baseline VAR variables plus PCOM, a commodity price index ordered third in the first block. The center panel reports results for the baseline variables plus POIL, the price of oil ordered third in the first block and the right panel reports results for the baseline variables with the yen/$ exchange rate (YENDOL) ordered first in the third block of variables. A comparison of these results with the baseline specification results reported in Figures 1 and 2 suggests that adding these variables does not have much of an effect on the results reported above. The main difference is that including the yen/$ exchange rate dampens the response of the real interest rate. The implications for the yield curve though are virtually the same as the baseline specification.
Given that nominal interest rates in Japan are very low and simple arbitrage arguments suggest that zero is a lower bound, it is also interesting to consider ways to impose this restriction on the specification and investigate whether such restrictions affect our results. We considered two ways to impose this restriction. First, we add an additional test to the Monte Carlo simulations that requires that the unconditional mean of the one-month rate was non-negative. This does not rule out negative realizations of the nominal interest rate but does rule out the possibility of a negative average nominal interest rate. When we do this the number of successful draws falls to 3450. However, imposing this restriction has virtually no impact on 12 Second, we considered the following nonlinear transformation when the simulated mean of the nominal interest rate was less than 1% per annum:
where, the one-month rate is expressed as an annualized percentage. This transformation rules out negative realizations of the one-month rate in simulations where the mean of the one-month rate is less than 1%. The fraction of successful draws based on this specification is 19% and the impulse response functions are also close to those from the baseline specification.
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Finally, we performed runs in which the mean response during the first 6 periods was restricted instead of the sign. In this case, the fraction of successful draws for the baseline specification rises to 24% but the impulse responses are again qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the baseline case. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we have considered the effect of monetary policy on the Japanese yield curve. We have found that the effectiveness of monetary policy in affecting future expectations depends importantly on the maintained hypothesis about how monetary policy affects the economy. According to the liquidity effect hypothesis monetary policy is an ineffective tool at manipulating expectations about future nominal interest rates. Neither long-term bonds nor term premia respond persistently to monetary policy shocks. An entirely different picture emerges under the costly price adjustment maintained hypothesis. According to this perspective shocks to monetary policy in the 1980s and 1990s were important sources of variation in bonds of all maturities. Moreover, this hypothesis implies that the monetary authority has lots of ammunition. Monetary policy surprises that act to drive up short rates will alter expectations about future interest rates by shifting the level of the yield curve up in a persistent way and thereby stimulate the Japanese economy for a period of about 2 years.
In future work we plan to consider a broader array of assets and undertake a more complete identification of other macro shocks. This will allow us to quantitatively assess the role of various macroeconomic shocks in explaining events such as the collapse of the Japanese asset price boom in 1990.
12. For instance, the peak decline of the 5-year yield is -18.61 in the baseline case and -18.91 when R is restricted to be non-negative.
13. Here the peak decline in the 5-year yield is -16.03. 14. The maximum decline in the 5-year yield is -18.1.
